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　それでは、2007 年から 2008 年の間にいかなる要因が累積し危機に至ったのか。危機がいつ始
まったか、2007 年か 2008 年か、答えは人によって様々でしょう。ただ、白川先生も言われたよ























































Scheme of the presentation
1. The changing nature and objectives of central banks
2. The dominant central bank model before the recent global crisis
3. Inflation targeting, the Neo-Wicksellian approach, central bank 
reaction functions and the Taylor rule
4. The unsettled issue of financial stability
5. Planting the seeds of the Great Recession: macroeconomic, 
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31. The changing nature and objectives of central banks
Central banks-
Complex institutions






Tools: Traditional  vs. non-conventional
Policy dilemmas- primary objective?
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Chart 1. Long term price level indices
Source: Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, Europe, 1750-1988, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 1992; Jim O‘Donoghue ,  Louise Goulding: Consumer Price Inflation since 























































































Critiques brought to the FED for failure to act during the Great Depression
Importance of the objectives
Financial stability-




Chart 2. Central Bank assets relative to GDP


































































Average across all countries














Very low/negative interest 
rates
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Chart 3:  Long term interest rates, Annual averages, 1861-2014 
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9Chart 4: Proportion of countries with systemic banking crises 
(weighted by their share of world income) 
















































































































Chart 5:  Banking, currency, default and inflation crises








































































2. The dominant central bank model before the recent global crises
Prevalence of price stability  as main objective
1. Better inflation control with an independent central bank 
3. Low and stable inflation favours growth (Chart 7)
4. Independence in pursuing a limited objective
2. Shift of the Philipps curve- no cost in terms of reduced 
activity and higher unemployment ( Chart 6)
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Chart 7: The cost of inflation for long-term growth.






















































3. Inflation targeting, the Neo-Wicksellian approach, central bank reaction 
functions and the Taylor rule
ECB 





















Quantitative approach to monetary policy
“…the links between Reserve action and the money supply are sufficiently close, the
effects occur sufficiently rapidly, and the connections are sufficiently well understood, so
that reasonably close control over the money supply is feasible, given the will.”
“No substantial movements in the price level within fairly short periods have
occurred without movements in the same direction in the stock of money, and it
seems highly dubious that they could. Over long periods, changes in the stock of
money can in principle offset or reinforce other factors sufficiently to dominate trends
in the price level.”
Friedman, 1960
“While the stock of money is systematically related to the price level on the average, there
is much variation in the relation over short periods of time and especially for the mild
movements in both money and prices that characterize most of our experience and that
we would like to have characterize all.”
16




































































































1 + ireal = P1 ( 1 + i ) / P2;
(1+ π) =P2/P1
( 1 + ireal) = ( 1 + i ) / ( 1 + π ) Fisher equation
The original Taylor rule had the following form:
r = p + 0.5y + 0.5 (π -2) + 2                       (1.)
and can be rewritten, maybe more intuitively, as:
r = 4 + 0.5y + 1.5 (π -2)                            (2.)
Where: 
r is the federal funds rate
π is the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters
y is the percent deviation of real GDP from a target
and 2 is the desired inflation rate while 4 is the equilibrium interest rate when both the 
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%
EONIA average MRO Deposit rate MLF
Source: ECB
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Interest rates within a corridor system
Where
is the market interest rate on day t
is the interest rate at the end of the maintenance period
is the expectation operator based on information available on day t
is the rate applying when banks are long on liquidity and depositing it with the ECB  
is the probability of banks being long on liquidity at the end of the maintenance period
is the rate when banks are short of liquidity and borrowing from the ECB 





































































































































Daily Reserve Surplus/Deficit (lhs)

























































Chart 13: Monetary Policy Implementation in the Unites States
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4. The unsettled issue of financial stability






“contribute to the smooth conduct”, “may 
offer advice”, “may perform specific tasks”
vs
“The primary objective of the European 






Chart 13: The dilemma between financial and price stability
Inflation




Dilemma: inflation is too 
high but there is excessive 
risk aversion
No Dilemma: inflation is 
too high and financial 
stability is at risk
No Dilemma: inflation is 
too low and there is 
excessive risk aversion
Dilemma: inflation is too 
low but there are risks to 
financial stability
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Note: Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers And Real GDP;  
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5. Planting the seeds of the Great Recession
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Macroeconomic failings     
Regulatory failings
Financial failings
Intellectual failings
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